Import Address Table (IAT) Analysis

What is the Import Address Table?

The Import Address Table (IAT) lists the external functions from Windows DLLs that the program calls. When Windows loads a PE file, it resolves the addresses of all imported functions and writes them into the IAT. The program then calls these functions through the IAT entries.

Examining the IAT reveals a great deal about a binary's intended behaviour without running it. Every imported function is a capability declaration.

Reading the IAT in PEStudio

Open any PE file in PEStudio. Navigate to the Imports tab. For each imported DLL, you see the function names. PEStudio automatically flags known suspicious functions in red.

Look for:

• DLLs that suggest network activity (wininet.dll, ws2_32.dll)
• DLLs that suggest process manipulation (kernel32.dll with injection APIs)
• DLLs that suggest registry access (advapi32.dll with Reg* functions)
• DLLs that suggest cryptography (crypt32.dll, bcrypt.dll)

Suspicious API Patterns

Imported Function(s)	Behavioural Indication
CreateFileA/W, WriteFile, DeleteFileA/W	File manipulation. Dropping payloads or deleting evidence.
RegOpenKeyExA/W, RegSetValueExA/W	Registry modification. Establishing persistence via Run key.
VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect	Memory allocation with custom permissions. Strong indicator of shellcode injection or runtime unpacking.
CreateRemoteThread, WriteProcessMemory	Code injection into another process.
OpenProcess with PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS	Targeting another process for injection or hollowing.
InternetOpenA, HttpSendRequestA	HTTP communication. Likely contacting a C2 server.
URLDownloadToFileA	Single-call downloader pattern. Downloads payload from URL.
GetAsyncKeyState, SetWindowsHookExA	Keyboard monitoring. Keylogger behaviour.
IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent	Anti-debugging checks.
CreateProcessA/W	Process creation. May spawn cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
FindResource, LoadResource, LockResource	Extracts embedded payload from PE resources. Dropper pattern.
CryptEncrypt, CryptGenKey	Cryptographic operations. May indicate ransomware.

The Stripped IAT — A Major Red Flag

A binary whose import table contains only LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress is resolving its real imports at runtime to hide them from static analysis.

Normal binary IAT:
  kernel32.dll: CreateFileA, WriteFile, VirtualAlloc, CreateProcessA...
  wininet.dll:  InternetOpenA, HttpOpenRequestA, HttpSendRequestA...
  advapi32.dll: RegOpenKeyExA, RegSetValueExA...

Packed/obfuscated binary IAT:
  kernel32.dll: LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress

The malware uses LoadLibraryA to load any DLL at runtime and GetProcAddress to resolve any function by name — leaving nothing visible to static analysis. This is characteristic of packed or manually-mapped executables.

Next action when you see a stripped IAT: check entropy, check section names, run DIE. The binary is almost certainly packed — unpack it before proceeding.

API Hashing

Some malware resolves imports without calling LoadLibraryA at all. It computes a hash of each API name and walks the export table of loaded DLLs to find a matching hash. No import table entry is created.

; API hashing loop (simplified)
hash_loop:
    mov  eax, [esi]          ; load current export name
    call compute_hash        ; compute custom hash of name
    cmp  eax, 0xDEADBEEF     ; compare to target hash
    je   found               ; if match, use this function address
    add  esi, 4              ; next export
    jmp  hash_loop

The hardcoded hash values (0xDEADBEEF in this example) are the only trace of the intended API call. Finding these in a disassembler requires computing the hash function in reverse — or running the sample and breaking when the hash matches.

Capability Mapping with Capa

Rather than manually reading every import, run Capa (Mandiant) on the binary:

capa suspicious.exe

Capa maps code patterns to behavioural capabilities and MITRE ATT&CK techniques:

+------------------------------------------------------+
| CAPABILITY                       | NAMESPACE          |
+------------------------------------------------------+
| delete shadow copies             | impact             |
| query registry                   | discovery          |
| communicate via HTTP             | c2                 |
| capture keystrokes               | collection         |
+------------------------------------------------------+

Capa reads more than just the IAT — it analyses code patterns and recognises capability implementations even when imports are stripped.

Practical Workflow

1. Open in PEStudio → check Imports tab
2. If IAT is stripped (only LoadLibrary + GetProcAddress):
   → check entropy → confirm packing → unpack first
3. If IAT is visible:
   → flag suspicious API groups from the table above
   → run Capa for behavioural capability summary
   → note APIs as predicted IOCs before dynamic analysis
4. Compare predicted behaviour against dynamic analysis results

Predicted behaviour from the IAT becomes a hypothesis. Dynamic analysis confirms or refutes it.